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Summary  findings
In research on how population growth  affects economic  *  The common practice of using investment rates as a
performance, some researchers stress that population  proxy for capital stock growth  rates is completely
growth  reduces the natural resources and capital  unjustified, as the two are uncorrelated  across countries.
(physical and human) per worker while other researchers  *  There is either no correlation, or a weak positive
stress how greater population size and density affect  correlation, between the growth of years of schooling per
productivity.  worker and the population growth rate.
Despite these differing theoretical predictions, the  *  Enrollment rates are even worse as a crude proxy
empirical literature has focused mainly on the  for the expansion of the educational capital stock, as the
relationship between population growth and output per  rwo are negatively correlated.
person (or crude proxies for factor accumulation). It has  * There  is no correlation,  or a weak negative
not decomposed the effect of population through factor  correlation, between measures of total factor
accumulation and the effect through productivity.  productivity growth and population growth.
Pritchett uses newly created cross-country, time-series  *  Nearly all of the weak correlation between the
data on physical capital stocks and the educational stock  growth of output per person and population growth  is
of the labor force to establish six findings:  the result of shifts in participation in the labor force, not
* There is no correlation  between the growth of  of changes in output per worker.
capital per worker and population growth.
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Introduction
Is population growth good or bad for economic performance?  This question has
stubbornly resisted a satisfying theoretical or empirical resolution 2. Some theories suggest that
more rapid population growth should be bad for economic performance because with a larger
population each worker will have less productive factors, both non-accumulated and
accumulated, to work with.  Other theories suggest that greater population growth will lead to
greater productivity either by inducing innovation, producing  innovation, or through creating
greater economies of scale, specialization or agglomeration (Boserup,  1981, Simon,  1992,
Kremer,  1993).  Robert Cassen's  (1994) recent summary of the state of the art in research on
population and development, states nicely the conventional wisdom of contrasting negative
factor accumulation effects versus possibly positive productivity effects:
What  about  the effect of population  on  per capita income? Here simple  economics  suggests  that
the effect is probably  negative. Unless  population  exerts a strong  positive  influence  on capital
formation-and  the suggestion  that it does is a minority  opinion-the  more people  there are, and the
less capital  there is per person; as a result  even though  total output  may be larger with a bigger
population,  output  per person is smaller. There are however,  three  arguments  against  this: larger
population  may generate  economies  of scale; they  may induce  favorable  technological  change; and
when population  is growing,  the average  age of the labor  force  will be younger,  which  may have
beneficial  productivity  effects.
The fact that the different theories predict a different causal mechanism whereby
Many  thanks  to Deon  Filmer  for  insightful  comments.
2  For discussion  of the  nature  of the "general  agreement"  that "persistent  widespread  poverty,  is influenced  by
population  growth  rates  adopted  by  the  in the  Progranmme  of Action  of the  recent  International  Conference  on Population
and  Development  in Cairo  see Demeny,  1994.3
population  affects economic  performance  suggests a possible resolution  of the old and
persistent empirical  puzzle of the generally  small and statistically  insignificant  impacts  of
population  growth on the growth  of GDP per capita (Kuznets 1960; Kelley  and Schmidt 1994,
Kling and Pritchett 1995). Table 1 presents  the basic regressions  of the per annum  growth
rate over the entire period of output per worker and population  growth 3. The table shows the
weak, ambiguous, and imprecisely  estimated  correlation of output growth with population
growth, especially in the developing  countries, that is typical of the literature.
3  A number  of more recent  papers  (Brander  and Downck 1994,  Kelley  and Schmidt  1994)  have gone beyond  the
growth  rates over  the entire  period  of data availability  and have  either disaggregated  the data into shorter subsets  and
run separate  regressions  (e.g. by decades  in Kelley  and  Schmidt)  or have nade the data into a panel  using  growth  rates
over shorter  periods (e.g. five year averages  in Brander  and Dowrick). However, I only  use the growth  rates over
the entire  period  because  populations,  and more  especially  the data on populations,  change  only  very  slowly  compared
to the large, rapid  changes  seen  in output. Although  population  data is available  at five  year intervals  for nearly  every
country  in the world  through  U.N. and World  Bank  sources this is only because  the data are created  to be reported.
For instance,  in table 5 of the UN Demographic  Yearbook,  1990  (published  in 1992)  annual  estimates  of mid-year
population  1981-1990  are reponed for Tanzania,  El Salvador,  and Nigeria  even though  the latest population  census
for those countries was, respectively, 1978, 1971 and 1963! This is not to say that the population  figures are
necessarily unreliable about the level of a country's population.  But it is questionable  whether the Gbw= in a
country's  population  growth  rate  between  say, 1980-85  and 1985-90  in countries  whose  latest  census  is 1985  or before
(which is the case for 45 of 60 African  and 28 of 36 American  countries)  has any real information  content at all.
Second,  even  if the data were perfect,  actual  population  growth  represents  primarily  individual  country  growth  trends
and very little  variation  across  time  periods,  in sharp  contrast  the huge  changes  and very low  persistence  of economic
growth  rates over time (Easterly,  et. al., 1993). At five year average observations  over the 30 year period 1960  to
1990, 84 percent of the total sample  variance  in population  growth  rates is accounted  for by country fixed  effects.
In contrast  in the same sample,  country  fixed  effects  account  for only 23 percent  of the variation  in GDP growth  rates
(this  small fraction is even more dramatic  for annual  data while the share of output variation  due to country effects
is quite  small  even  over  as long  a periods  as a decade). Therefore, the move to shorter  periods of data is unlikely  to
provide  any meaningful  information  about long-run  growth effects.4
Table 1:  Population  growth and the growth of GDP per worker
Dependent variable: Growth rate of GDP per worker,  1960-87.
Summers-Heston (PWT5) data  World Bank data
All  LDC  DC  All  LDC  DC
Population  -.024.  .267  -.649  -.322  -.123  -.516
growth  (.132)  (.880)  (1.10)  (1.74)  (.336)  (.866)
N  112  89  23  80  58  22
R-Squared  .000  .009  .055  .038  .002  .036
Note: Absolute  value of t-statistics  in parenthesis.
Perhaps the factor dilution  effects of population  growth leaving each worker with less
to work with are on average  just offset by the productivity  enhancing  effects that make each
worker more productive  that the net impact  of population  growth on output per worker is
small enough to be statistically  indistinguishable  from zero.  This paper explores  this
possibility  empirically  using recently created  cross national, time series, data sets on GDP,
physical  capital stocks and the educational  attainment  of the labor force.  This data and the
use of a standard  model of economic  growth allows the decomposition  of the growth of output
per worker into a component  due to the accumulation  of factors of production (physical  and
human  capital)  and a residual (which can be called "total factor productivity" or TFP).
I take the approach  that the aggregate  GDP (value  added) function can be adequately
approximated  as a constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas production function with factor
neutral technical  progress using physical  capital (K), human  capital (H) and labor (L)
(equation 1).
1)
Y(t)  =A@()KaI' ,NL,  '5
With these particular (and restrictive) assumptions the growth rate of output per worker can be
expressed (by dividing through by the labor force, taking natural logs, and differentiating with
respect to time ) as linear function of the growth of the physical capital stock growth (  k  ),
human capital per worker growth (  h  ) and a change in the production function multiplier
(a(t)) (equation 2).
2)
j=a,t  a.,  a(i)
In equation 3, I dfl=  TFP growth as the residual part of growth captured in this
model by the time rate of production change of the production function scale factor 4.
3)
TiFP y - - arh
Since I am working with a production function I use the growth of output per worker as
the dependent variable. The growth of output per person is a different conceptual question as it
involves the determination of participation rates (see below). I use the labor force series
imnplicit  in the Summers Heston (1991) data set which are derived from the ILO series on
"economically active population"  rather than use just labor force aged population5.
4  I deliberately  use the initials  TFP to emphasize  that this is not productivity  in the broad sense, but a particular
model  dependent  concept. Any other growth  model  would  give a different  definition  of TFP.
'  Much  of the literature  (e.g. Mankiw,  Romer,  Weil, 1992)  does  not use  actual  estimates  of the  labor  force  in
assessing  output  per worker  but instead  output  per person aged 15-64  usually  calling this the 'potential' labor force.
This is typically  defended  on the grounds  that data on labor  force are notoriously  unreliable  and because  the concept
of 'economically active population' which is used to estimate  the labor force is extremely  difficult to pin down.
However,  no matter  how  bad the ILO data on the "economically  active  population"  are, they are better than  assuming6
I!  Population  growth and physical  capital per worker
Q:  Did countries  with more rapid population  growth  have a lower rate of growth of
capital per worker?
A:  No.
To answer this question  I use two newly created estimates  of the stocks  of physical
capital  6.  Nehru and Dhareshewar  (N-D) (1993) use World Bank  data on gross investments
since 1960 and an estimate  of the initial capital stock  to create perpetual inventory  estimates  of
the stock of physical  capital for 93 developed  and developing  countries from 1960 to 1987.7
Independently,  King and Levine (K-L) (1994)  created estimates  of capital stocks using the
perpetual  inventory  method and an initial capital stock estimate, but using the GDP and
investment  rate data from Summers  and Heston (1991) Penn World Table, Mark 5 (PWT5)  for
136 developed  and developing  countries for 1960-1988. In spite of the differences in methods
and data, the correlation between  the country capital stock growth rates calculated  from the
these two series is a quite high .88.
what is known  to be false,  a 100  percent  participation  rate for all men and women  of a certain  age group. Moreover,
the assumption  implicit  in using 'labor force  aged population' is false in a way which creates  biases because  of the
relationship  between population  growth  and labor force participation.
6  I  want to emphasize  that  all of the empirical  estimates  are of a simple,  linear,  bivariate  relationship. I am only
asking the factual  question  about the linear correlation  between  the various variables  and population  growth.  I am
not estimating  and  particular  structural  model  or identifing any parameters. All statements  about the "relationship'
or 'effect" or "impact"  of population  growth should  be interpreted  in this very limited  sense of linear association.
'  The two principal  drawbacks  of the Nehru  capital stock series is that they do not incorporate  any information
on the relative  price of investment  goods or on the composition  of investment. DeLong  and Summers, 1991,  have
shown  both  of these  to be important  in relating  investment  to economic  performance. Investment  prices vary a great
deal across  countries  and comparisons  of capital  stocks  across countries  will overstate  the productive  stock of capital
in countries  with  high  capital  goods  prices. They also show that equipment  investment  (e.g. machinery)  tends to be
much more important  in explaining  growth  that other types (e.g. structures  and transport).7
Table 2 presents the results of regressing  the growth of capital per worker on
population  growth for both series for three country groups: all countries,  just developing
countries  (LDCs) and just developed  countries (DCs).  For the entire sample  the N-D data
shows a very small and insignificant  negative  effect while the K-L data show  a small and
insignificant  positive effect.  Intriguingly,  when the sample is split into developed  and
developing  countries the estimate is positive (while insignificant)  for both capital stock series
in the LDC sample, but negative  (although  still insignificant)  for both developed  country
samples.
Table 2:  Population  growth and the growth of physical capital per worker.
Dependent  variable:  Growth rate of physical capital  per worker, 1960-87.
Nehru-Dhareshewar  data  King-Levine  data
l____________  All  LDC  DC  All  LDC  DC
Population growth  -.083  .077  -.699  .200  .407  -.652
(.313)  (.163)  (.738)  (.736)  (.901)  (.732)
N  89  66  23  112  89  23
R-Squared  .001  .000  .025  .005  .009  .025
Note:  Absolute  value of t-statistics  in parenthesis.
In either case the role of population  growth as a determinant  of the accumulation  of
physical  capital per worker is very small, as indicated  by the extremely  low R 2 values. For
the LDCs never more than 1 percent of the capital per worker growth variance is associated
with population  growth.  As illustrated  in figure 1 there is tremendous  variation  in the rate of
capital  stock growth per worker, from a maximum  of over 10 per annum in the East Asian
Dragons to a average of minus one percent per annum in Zambia, while the population  growth8
rates are rather more narrowly  concentrated,  especially  among  the developing  countries,
between  about 1.5 and 4 percent 8.
Given the long history of debate about the impact  of population  growth, isn't this
striking (lack of a) relationship  inconsistent  with an enormous  previous literature? Actually,
no, as all of the previous  cross-national  empirical literature  that I am aware of examines  the
relationship  across  countries  between population  growth and either investment  or savings rates
expressed  as shares of GDP.  While examining  the relationship  between population  growth and
either savings  rates or investment  rates may be of interest for understanding  the impacts  of
demographic  shifts on these aggregates, it is, it turns out, completely  irrelevant for the present
purpose of examining  the impact  on capital accumulation. It is irrelevant for the very simple
reason that, over the period this data covers, average  investment  rates are uncorrelated  with
the growth rate of the capital  stock.  The correlation between the ratio of investment  to GDP
and the growth rate of the capital stock growth is only .058 in the World Bank-N-D  data and
only
This feature of the tremendous variation in economic outomces versus labor force growth is pointed out sharply
in the most recent World Development Report,  1995 (figure 2.5).Figure 1:  Population growth and growth rate of physical capital per
worker
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022 in the PWT5-K-L  data set.  Figure 2 shows the relationship  between the country specific
average  investment  rates and the per annum growth rates of physical capital in the two series 9.
Even if one were concerned  about the population  growth impact  on investment  or
savings rates, the most recent empirical results are ambiguous. Brander and Dowrick (1994)
find a negative, but statistically  insignificant,  relationship  between investment  and birth rates
using fixed effects  estimates  for the poorest countries.  For the more developed  countries they
find a non-linear  effect such that higher birth rates raise investment  rates up to a birth rate of
about 3 percent. As for savings rates, Kelley and Schmidt (1994)  temper the usual finding of
very little cross-national  correlation  between savings rates and population  growth only in
finding  a strong and significant  negative  correlation of population  growth on savings when the
period of estimation  is limited to the 1980s.
9 This lack of correlation  merits  a brief explanation. Starting  from the simple  perpetual  inventory  equation  for
capital:  K  '  K  + l  - o*K  , we can derive  an expression  for the percentage  growth in the capital stock  as
I  t  -I  I  -
*  (._.)  - , which is the inverse  of the capital output ratio times the investment  ratio less the
K,_ 1 Y,  l
depreciation  rate.  If every country  had the same  capital-output  ratio then  the investment  share of GDP would  be a
good proxy for the growth rate of capital. While it was once thought  that capital-output  ratios remained roughly
constant  during development  (Kaldor 1961),  the existing  data on capital stocks  strongly  suggest  this is not so (King
and Levine  1994,  Young 1994). When  the capital-output  ratio is not constant  this creates  an enormous  problem  with
using investment  rates as a proxy for the growth of the capital stock.  If a country  with a low K/Y ratio (say 1)
suddenly increases its investment  ratio to 20 percent the growth rate of capital would  be 20 percent per annum
(assuming  a 5 percent depreciation). On the other hand, a 20 percent investment  ratio in a country  with a capital-
output  ratio of 3 would  produce  capital  growth of only 1.6 percent.  This concern  about the implications  of varying
K/Y ratios is far from merely  theoretical.  In the N-D  data Korea's investment  ratio is 21.5 while the growth  of the
capital  stock  was 12.5 percent  as Korea's  K/Y ratio was rising rapidly  while  Germany's  average  investment  ratio was
slightly hh=ig,  at 22.3 percent but Germany's growth rate of the capital stock was only one-third as large, 3.9
percent.Figure 2:  Growth of physical capital and the average investment to
GDP ratio
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II)  Growth  in the years of schooling
Q:  Did countries  with more rapid population  growth have less growth in schooling
per worker?
A:  No.
In order to examine  the impact  of population  growth on education  I use two recently
created estimates  of the mean years of schooling  of the labor force aged population. Nehru,
Swanson  and Dubey (N-S-D) (1994)  create an estimate of the average  years of schooling  of the
population  aged 15-64 using a perpetual inventory  method based on enrollment rates.  Barro
and Lee (B-L)  (1993) have created an estimate  of the years of schooling  of the population  aged
25 and above using estimates  of the highest  level of school completed from census  or survey
data.
Table 3 presents the estimates  of regressing  the percentage per annum  of the years of
schooling  of the labor force on population  growth for each of the two series.  In the whole
sample, higher population  growth is associated  with  faster percentage growth of years of
schooling. In LDCs faster population  growth, using either data series, is associated  with an
increased  rate of growth of schooling  per person, by about .9 percentage points (.88 and .87),
a point estimate  which borders on statistical  significance.11
Table 3:  Population  growth and the growth of years of schooling  of the labor force
aged population.
Dependent  variable: Per annum  percentage  growth rate of years of schooling  per worker
Nehru-Swanson-Dubey data  Barro-Lee data
Sample:  All  LDC  DC  All  LDC  DC
Population  growth  1.4  .88  .373  .935  .871  -.213
(6.14)  (1.89)  (.947)  (3.88)  (2.04)  (.503)
N  81  59  22  93  71  22
R-Squared  .323  .059  .043  .142  .057  .012
Note:  Absolute  values of t-statistics  in parenthesis.
Of course the percentage  growth rate of the years of schooling  may be somewhat
misleading. A percentage  change rate will be very large when beginning  from a small base
(e.g. an increase  of one year of schooling  from 1 to 2 is a hundred percent increase  while an
equal absolute increase  of one year from 10 to 11 is a ten percent increase). Since the
countries that tend to have rapid population  growth also have an initially low stock of
schooling  this leads  to a positive correlation of population  growth on percentage  change
stocks. Table 4 shows the same set of regressions,  done in the growth rate of the kuI  (not
the natural log) of schooling  (hence  the rate is the absolute increase in school years per worker
per year, not the percentage  change). Population  growth is not significantly  related to the rate
of growth of schooling  years using this measure either, as illustrated in figure 3. Even in the
LDCs, where one expects  the negative  result to be the strongest, the Nehru-Swanson-Dubey
data gives a negative  (and insignificant)  estimate (-.53) while the Barro-Lee  data is slightly
positive (.10), also insignificant.Figure 3:  Population growth and the growth rate of years of schooling
of the labor force
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Table 4:  Population growth and the growth of years of schooling of the labor force
aged population
Dependent variable:  Per annum growth of years of schooling (absolute) per worker
Nehru-Swanson-Dubey data  Barro-Lee data
Sample:  All  LDC  DC  All  LDC  DC
Population growth  1.53  -.533  3.89  -.440  .101  1.80
(3.07)  (.635)  (1.69)  (1.14)  (.167)  (1.11)
N  81  59  20  91  71  20
R-Squared  .109  .007  .137  .014  .000  .064
Note:  Absolute values of t-statistics in parenthesis.
Is this result consistent with the literature and, more importantly, with common sense?
If the budget devoted to education is fixed (either at the household or public expenditure level)
then a greater growth of the school aged population (which tends to be highly correlated with
population growth overall) would appear to lead to less schooling per child.  However, this
intuition is not completely borne out by the data.  Schultz (1987) using multi-variate estimates
in cross country data found no particular impact of the fraction of the population aged 6-17 on
the enrollment rate'°.  Kelley (1995) reviews the literature on the impact of population growth
on education and finds that neither the aggregate cross-country nor the household level
empirical studies confirm the feared reduction in schooling from rapid population growth
and/or large family size.
However, Schultz's (1987) paper does show that while a larger young cohort did
increase (or at least not decrease) enrollment rates it also tended to reduce teachers salaries,
'°  For his preferred estimates  for total school system  enrollments  (table 10) the impact of larger share of
population  in the 6 to 17 age bracket  was to raise  the overall  enrollment  ratio.13
decrease  teacher-student  ratios and reduce expenditures  per child.  Hence the discussion  often
focuses  on whether or not rapid population  growth  deteriorates not the quantity but the quality
of education. This is a critically important  point, as the correct measure of schooling  is not
whether or not a child sat in a schoolroom,  but what they learned.
But, how does one measure the amount  of learning  quality of education? The first, and
widely  unresisted, temptation  is to use expenditures  per pupil as a proxy for quality, but this is
wrong, for at least three reasons. First, since in every developing  country education  is
predominantly  publicly produced, assuming  that educational  output is produced in a cost
minimizing  way such that increases  in expenditures  automatically  translate into improvements
in performance  is almost certainly  false.  The relationship  between quality and costs is
tenuous, at best.  Hanushek  (1986)  shows that in the U.S. studies do not show any clear
relationship  between  resource inputs (whether  measured  as expenditures  per pupil, teachers per
student, etc) and outputs as measured as test score improvements. Harbison and Hanushek
(1992) and Hanushek  (1995)  show that much of this ambiguity  about the relationship  between
resource inputs  and educational  outputs holds true in developing  country studies as well.
Jimenez, Lockheed  and Paqeuo (1991) present  five country case studies in which private
school students  outperformed  public school students  (even after correcting for selection  effects)
while unit costs were lower in private than public schools, usually by a substantial  margin
which implies  public systems are not efficient. Moreover, there are enormous differences
across  countries in the cost of producing  a year of primary or secondary  schooling, even after
accounting  for general differences  in wage levels. Table 5 gives representative  figures of the
cost per secondary  school year as a fraction  of GDP per capita for selected countries. This14
unit cost ranges from a low of 12 in the Philippines  to 343 in Tanzania. It is difficult to know
what part of this represents  quality differences  and what part cost differences  due to
differences  in supply and what part pure inefficiency  and what part pure measurement  error,
but it is difficult to believe  that secondary  education  in Korea is only one fifth as good as that
in Cote d'Ivoire.  If one examines  test scores and expenditures  across countries or over time
within a country, one comes to the same conclusion. Fourteen year old German students  score
about the same on reading  as Greek students, even though the German system spends  six times
as much per pupil (Elley, 1994). In the United  States between 1960 and 1990 expenditures
per pupil have  tripled, with no evidence of significant  improvement  in test scores (Hanushek
and others 1994). Given  this array of facts,  it is difficult to maintain  that the relationship
between costs and educational  outputs is sufficiently  tight that per pupil costs can reliably be
used as indicators  of quality.15
Table 5:  Estimates  of the cost of secondary  schooling  in various
countries, mid 1980sb.
Country  Costa  as a percent of












Cote d'Ivoire  109
Medianc  62
Source: Tan and Mingat, 1992 (table  B4. 1), World Bank, 1988  (table
A-18).
Notes: a)  In Africa the estimate is public recurrent expenditure  per pupil,
while in Asia the estimate is total unit cost, b) estimates  are 1983 for
Africa, various years in the 1980s for Asia, c) the median is for all
countries reported in the original source, 31 for Sub-Saharan  Africa, 11
for Asia.
Second, an oft used indicator of school quality, teachers  per student, is an extremely
dubious indicator  of school quality. Classroom  level studies show very little difference in
student  performance  in primary schooling  across large ranges of classroom  size and very few
country's school systems  push these upper limits".  For instance, in Korea the student-teacher
ratio in primary education  in 1980  was 47.5 compared to only 30.4 in the Philippines,  yet on
"  This  probably  accounts  for the ambivalent  signs in statistical  studies. Harbison  and Hanushek  (1992) review
the results of 30 studies  of the relationship  of teacher/pupil  ratios in developing  countries  and report that 8 find a
positive  and significant  effect, 8 find a negative  and significant  effect and 14 find a statistically  insignificant  effect.16
internationally  comparable  tests of science  achievement  of ten year old in the mid 1980s Korea
students  received scores 60 percent higher than those in the Philippines  (Tan and Mingat,
1992).
Third, another way to measure the impact  of population  growth on schooling  quality
would  be to measure outputs, such as cognitive  skills acquired or better yet from an economic
vantage  point, actual improvements  in productivity. However, measuring  the quality of
education  by outputs is extremely  difficult. For instance, say we measure  just the productivity
enhancing  aspect of education  by the wage increment  to schooling  derived from wage
equations. If more rapid population  growth were associated  with poorer quality schooling  the
wage  regressions  could show that schooling  had less impact on wages where population
growth was higher.  Using data from Psacharopoulus  (1993) recent update of returns to
schooling  I regress the coefficient on years of schooling  in a regression  on (log) wages  on the
rate of population  growth in the period preceding  the observation  and the country's stock of
education  at the time' 2. In this data there is no (partial)  correlation at all between  the wage
increment  from education  and prior population  growth.  Using data on wage increments  from a
year of schooling  as a proxy for school quality provides no support for the population  growth-
education  quality deterioration  thesis.
The point of going on at length  on this seemingly  unrelated  point is that many have
estimated  the impact  of population  growth on expenditures  per pupil as a proxy for quality and
concluded  that population  growth is harmful for educational  quality.  However, the concerns
12  The data are taken from Psacharopoulus (1993) which gives the most recent available estimates  for sixty-two
countries. Since  the estimates  are from different  years. the data for population  growth  and human  capital stock (from
the N-S-D series)  are matched.17
about expenditures per pupil (or some other input) as a proxy for quality are not a minor
quibble but represent real, first order, problems. While higher population growth is not
associated with lower growth of the quantity of schooling per person,  whether the quality of
schooling per person has been affected is, and will remain, given the available data on school
quality, an open question.
IHl) Population and productivity
Q:  Did countries with more rapid population growth have more rapid productivity
growth?
A:  No.
Most of the theories that suggest that a larger population might be good for economic
growth suggest a mechanism whereby an increased population increases the productivity with
which factors are used.  A quick review of the (at least) four reasons why a larger population
might be good for growth might be helpful.  These are: a) innovation by population pressures,
b) innovation produced by greater numbers, c) scale economies, d) agglomeration economies.
Each of these possible economic growth impacts of population have different implications, as
some are related to the absolute numbers of individuals some are related to the change in the
number of individuals and levels of output and some the distribution of population.
The pressure of greater population itself may induce changes that lead to greater
productivity.  Boserup (1981) for instance argues that in historically agrarian societies greater
population pressure led to innovations both in productive technique and in social organization.
Even if the rate of innovation per person does not increase with greater population or density
as Boserup suggests, but is constant with population growth then a greater  population will lead18
to a greater rate of technological  progress' 3.
Second, many of the "new" growth theories focus on the fact that knowledge is non-
14 rival, so that once an innovation  is made any number  of people  can use the same idea
Empirically,  larger countries do not seem to have higher rates of technical progress but the
country might not be the relevant unit for measuring innovation" 5. Kremer (1993) shows that,
at least until recently, higher rates of world population  growth were associated  with more
rapid technical  progress.
Third, even with a given technology  and inputs, greater population  could lead to
greater output through  either economies  of scale or of agglomeration. While many industrial
activities  are clearly  characterized  by some  economies  of scale there is very little evidence  of
scale economies  at the national level (Backus,  Backus,  and Kehoe, 1993) as, in general, the
larger countries (measured  either as population  size or total output)  do not grow faster.  The
very rapid growth of small economies  such as Singapore,  Hong Kong, and, more recently
Mauritius, suggests  that international  trade can easily substitute  for the size of the domestic
economy in particular industries 16.
Finally, even in the absence of economies  of scale, greater population, can lead to
'"Of  course  the rate of innovation  per person could be declining  with  population  growth if more rapid population
growth  reduced  the accumulation  of innovation  capital. However,  what innovation  capital is and whether population
growth  affects it are completely  open empirical  questions.
"  The 'new'  in new growth theories of course must be qualified. The implications  of the non-rivalry  of
knowledge  for growth  have  been known  for some time as Kuznets  (1961)  for instance  discusses  them quite nicely.
IS  Although  this raises  the question  of the diffusion  of innovations;  do they remain within  localities  or countries.
If diffusion  is rapid  across  country  boundaries  then the whole  world is better off with larger population  even if large
countries  are not. For evidence  on international  spillovers  see Bernstein  and Mohnen, 1994 and Coe and Helpman,
1993.
"6  See Srinivasan  (1985) for a discussion  of the costs and benefits  of being small.19
agglomeration  economies,  that is, the densitv of economic  activity accounts  for greater
productivity. Agglomeration  economies  can come from either reduced transaction  costs,
increased  specialization,  facilitation  of within-industry  spill-overs  of innovations,  or financing
the fixed costs of social overhead  capital".  Agglomeration  economies  at some level are an
obvious fact as the existence  of cities, for instance, is the product of agglomeration  economies
so concentration  must increase  resource productivity  at least up to some point.  The cross
national  evidence is somewhat  weaker, although  the growth regressions  in Kelley and Schmidt
(1994) show  consistently  strong positive  effects of population  density across a variety of
samples  and time periods".
However, in this present work I will not try to disentangle  the various channels  of
effect, I will simply  correlate  growth of TFP to population  growth. To implement  the
decomposition  of output growth into a factor accumulation  component  and TFP described in
equation  (3) 1  have to choose a aK  and aH  . I use two methods to fix these coefficients. First,
I use a cross-country  growth regression  to estimate  the two coefficients. Second,  since the
regression  approach  raises some anomalies  I use non-regression  based estimates  that are
suggested  by theory and the national  accounts  data.  The regression  estimates  are described in
appendix 1 while the data behind  the estimates  for the non-regression  estimates  are described
in appendix  2.
Regression  estimates  of TEFP.  Using the PWT5 (GDP), K-L (Capital),  B-L (Schooling)
"  This is a second  important  element  of Boserup's  (1981) story of the importance  of population  density in
promoting  urbanization  in ancient  times.
"  Kelley  and  Schmidt  (1994) also include  a term for the absolute  size of population  and find generally  positive.
but smaller and less robustly  significant,  scale effects.20
data the results suggest an exactly zero population growth correlation while the World Bank
(GDP), N-D (Capital), N-S-D (Schooling) data suggest a modest negative impact (table 6).
For the developing countries taken alone, the coefficient is statistically insignificant in both
data sets.  Figure 4 shows the relation between population and TFP growth for the two data
sets.
Table 6:  Population growth and TFP (using regression estimates of TFP)  1960-1987.
Dependent variable: TFP growth, regression method
Source of data  PWT5,  K-L and B-L  World Bank, N-D, N-S-D
Countries:  All  LDC  DC  All  LDC  DC
Growth of  -.084  .008  -.091  -.333  -.238  -.231
Population  (.756)  (.044)  (.366)  (2.47)  (1.03)  (.897)
N  92  71  21  80  59  21
R-Squared  .006  .000  .007  .073  .018  .041
Notes:  Absolute values of t-statistics in parenthesis.
TFP with factor  slares.  As discussed in appendix 1, the regression estimates used to
create the TFP estimates, especially the share on human capital, are unsatisfactory.  The
growth framework I am using suggests an alternative calculation: use the shares of income
attributable to physical and human capital derived from national accounts for the coefficients to
calculate TFP.  This is easier said than done, how much easier can been seen in appendix 2
where I describe the combination of data on national income shares, education of the labor
force, returns to education, and guesswork I use to come up with the assumption that the share
of capital is .4 and the share of human capital is .3.  Crudely put, if I take .4 as the share of
income to physical capital based on national accounts data, then .6 is the share of national21
income  to labor and if half of labor share of output is the return to education  then the human
capital share is .3'9. I use these shares to calculate  TFP and then regress this derived TFP
based on assumed shares  on population  growth.
Do countries with more rapid population  growth have more rapid TFP growth by this
second measure? No.  As shown in table 7 the results are again, if anything, that more rapid
population  growth leads to slower TFP growth.  For the developing  countries alone, the
population  growth association  is very weak in both data sets.  In the developed  countries the
correlation of population growth with TFP is large and negative, even statistically significantly
so using World Bank  GDP data overall, but not in the LDC sample.
Table 7:  The impact  of population  growth on TFP using estimates  of TFP based on
assumed  factor shares 1960-1987.
Dependent  variable: TFP growth, factor shares method
Sources of data:  PWT5, B-L, K-L  World Bank, N-S-D, N-D
Countries:  All  LDC  DC  All  LDC  DC
Growth of  .009  -.003  -.819  -.811  -.142  -1.41
Population  (.065)  (.014)  (1.28)  (4.42)  (.416)  (2.18)
N  92  71  21  80  59  21
R-Squared  .000  .000  .080  .200  .003  .201
Notes:  Absolute  values of t-statistics  in parenthesis.
IV) Output per worker and per pers
Before  concluding,  I would like to point out how the present work compares with the
previous  empirical literature  that examines  correlation  of population  and economic growth. I
19  Mankiw, Romer,  Weil, 1991, use  1/3,  1/3,  1/3.  We find both in the regressions  as well as in the national
accounts  that capital  share is higher, at least .4, but agree that half of all labor income is returns to education.Figure 4:  Population  growth and the growth of TFP  (regression
estimates)
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would  like to make two points, one empirical and one on interpretation. Empirically,  it
appears that output per person growth is lower with more rapid population  growth not because
output per person falls, but principally  because of differences in labor force participation.
This empirical finding raises the question of the welfare consequences  of demographically
induced shifts in labor force participation.
Empirical. More rapid population  growth is associated  with slower growth rate of labor
force participation  in our data.  Figure 5 displays  the relationship  between labor force
participation  and population  growth.  This relationship  explains why the negative  effects of
population  growth that are found in the literature are likely predominantly  shifts in labor force
composition. For instance, Brander  and Dowrick (1994)  find a relatively large and significant
effect of population  growth on output per person growth.  But when they decompose  that
effect into an output per worker effect and a workers per person effect, the output effect is
nearly all mediated  through  changes  in labor force participation. Similarly,  much of the work
on the "dynamics"  of the effect  of population  growth simply traces out the obvious
implications  of the fact that labor force participation  rate vary by age 20.
The same would be true in our data.  Table 8 shows the comparison  between the
association  of population  growth  and growth of output per pesn  and output per worker.  As
expected  the effect of population  growth is consistently  more negative  on output per person
than on output per worker, by about .4, in both samples  for both data sets.  While the data sets
disagree even on the sign of the population  growth correlation with GDP per worker in LDCs
20 For instance, Barlow (1994) estimates current output per capita as a function of current population growth and
lagged fertility.  He finds (not surprisingly) that controlling for lagged fertility (lagged 17 years, which has a positive
effect on output per person) current population growth has a negative effect on output per p,rson.  To some extent
this is rediscovering the obvious: that labor force participation rates are higher for adults than children.Population  growth  and  labor  force  participation  growth,  1960-88
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(.226 vs. -.43) both estimates  are insignificant. This evidence is also consistent  with the
hypothesis  that all of the typically estimated  negative impact  (even when it is found to be
statistically  significant)  between population  growth and per capita output is a labor force
participation  effect.
Table  8: Comparison  of the correlation  of population  growth  with  output  per  person  and  output  per worker. 1960-1990.
Data:  PWT5  data  World  Bank  data
Country  All  LDC  All  LDC
Sample:  l
Dependent  GDP/  GDPI  GDP/  GDP/  GDP/  GDP/  GDP/  GDP/
variable  Worker  Person  Worker  Person  worker  Person  Worker  Person
Population  -.024  -.363  .266  -.172  -.322  -.596  -.123  -. 441
growth  (.132)  (1.91)  (.880)  (.547)  (1.74)  (3.09)  (.336)  (1.12)
N  112  112  89  89  80  80  58  58
R-Squared  .000  .032  .009  .003  .038  .109  .002  .022
Notes: Absolute  values  of t-statistics  in parenthesis.
Welfare interpretation  I did not relate the growth of output per person growth and population
growth because  these empirical results can be (and often are) wildly misguided in their
interpretation. The question of the welfare  consequences  of changes  output per person that are
mediated  entirely  by changes in the ratio of labor force to population,  either because  of
changes in the age structure of population  or changes in labor force participation  of adults
(particularly  women)  are much too complicated,  theoretically  and empirically,  to be of much
interest.
Each time my wife and I have had a child (we have had three) our household  per capita
income  has fallen  by a substantial  amount but my household  welfare level rose (also by a24
substantial  amount) 2 ".  If the effect on other households  of my children is roughly zero then
economy  wide welfare increased  at the same time economy-wide  per capita income fell.  While
there are many situations  in which per capita income  is a reasonable  proxy for welfare, using
per capita income as a proxy for the welfare impact  of births is certainly not one of them.
GDP per capita as a welfare indicator is also wrong when a person shifts between
market and non-market  activities. Say a household  is just indifferent  between having one of its
members  performning  household  activities and working full-time  in the market at a going wage
(for a clean hypothetical  assume the choice is either-or). If the market wage then increases
even by a very small amount, the household  member  may switch into full-time  market labor
force participation. GDP per capita will rise by the full amount of the additional  marketed
output whereas  household  welfare has increased  by only a small amount. This anomaly  occurs
because GDP statistics  exclude  many non-marketed  services which  have traditionally  been
"women's work" in many societies. Output changes from changes in female labor force
participation  exaggerate the shift in household  welfare'.
Of course, the welfare interpretation  of household  composition  shifts and female  (also
force changes  depends  on the fact that births are a choice, not merely something  that
exogenously  happens  to a couple. As I have argued  elsewhere, although  there certainly are
unwanted  births and not every birth is the result of a woman's conscious  choice, the welfare
21  Some economists, although only economists, might question why my welfare rose by a substantial amount since
the conditions for intertemporal optimality in consumption specify that marginal utility per dollar  should be equalized
between goods.  However, given the integer constraint on children, the long lags in the production function, and the
resolution of the uncertainty created by the non-trivial health risks, even an economist can be joyful at a birth.
2  The same, of course.  is true of shifts in hours worked.  Hypothetically, if workers in country X worker 60
hours a week and workers in country Y who worked 40 hours a week, the fact output per worker  in country X was
higher would not indicate that welfare was higher.  The value of leisure foregone from the additional hours worker
needs to be taken into account.25
consequences  of births are best understood  within a choice based framework (Pritchett, 1994,
1995).
Conclusion
The belief that population  growth, especially  in developing  countries, is bad is the
predominant  view of the educated  public. This proposition's widespread  acceptance  derives at
least partially from its base in an incredibly  simple and powerful intuition: if there is a fixed
amount  of stuff (land, capital, savings, water, budget for education, or whatever)  then if there
are more people to share the stuff the average stuff per person must go down.  In the face of
this compelling  line of reasoning  the more ambiguous  and tenuous theory based on endogenous
behavioral  responses  to population  pressures, and complicated  econometric  work never has a
chance at persuasion. However, the evidence  presented here suggests  the basic premise is
wrong: there is not a fixed amount  of stuff.
There is certainly not a fixed amount of capital stuff.  Some  countries have
accumulated  capital very rapidly while others have barely maintained  or depreciated  their
existing stock. More specifically  there is no correlation between the rate of capital
accumulation  per worker and the rate of population  growth.  Both measures  of capital suggest
that, in developing  countries, capital  per worker grew more rapidly when population  growth
was rapid (although  these estimates  are small and statistically insignificant). The absolute
physical  capital growth was much more rapid in countries with rapid population  growth,
slightly more than enough to offset the impact  of more workers.
We also show that the amount  of children given the education  stuff is also not fixed.
Many developing  countries  have dramatically  expanded  the years of schooling  of their26
populations,  in many cases more than doubling the educational  levels of 1960. Again, there is
no evidence  that countries  with more rapid population  growth have seen a slower expansion  of
the education  of their labor force, either in absolute  or percentage  terms.  While the quality of
schooling  may have suffered, that is far from clear.
Those two results however do leave a deeper puzzle. The residual of output per
worker that is not accounted  for by factor accumulation  (call it TFP) ji weakly negatively
associated  with more rapid population  growth.  In fact, whatever  negative relationship  there is
between  growth of output per worker and population  is mediated  exclusively  through  a
deterioration  in TFP and not at all through  the factor dilution channels  that are the major focus
of most population  theories.27
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Appendix 1: Estimating TFP using
Table A.  1 reports the estimates  output per worker growth as a function of factor
accumulation  per worker using two different  data sets.  One is the World Bank data on
output 23 combined with the N-S-D years of schooling  and the N-D physical capital (derived
from World Bank investment  rates) and the estimates  of the labor force from Penn World
Tables, Mark 5 (PWT5) from Summers  and Heston (1991). The second data set PWT5 data
on output with the Barro-Lee  data on years of schooling  and the King-Levine  series on
physical  capital stocks (derived from PWT5 investment  rates).
Table A. 1 gives the estimates  of output per worker growth on the growth of physical
capital per worker and the growth rate in the years of schooling  (expressed  in absolute, not
percentage  growth, as using percentage  growth gives a negative coefficient). The results have
two problems  when interpreted within a Solow type growth production  function. The capital
share is too high.  Under the Solow  model assumptions  the capital coefficient  should be the
capital share in national income. This is more typically  estimated from national  accounts  to be
around .3 to .4 than the results of .5 (or above)  that the regressions  suggest. Second, the
coefficient  on years of schooling  is much lower than one would  expect for a human  capital
share (and not always even significant) 2'.
Table A.  1:  Estimates  of the growth in output  per worker as a function  of factor accumulation.
Dependent  variable:  Growth  of output  per worker
Data:  PWT5. B-L, K-L  World Bank, N-S-D,  N-D
Countries:  All  LDC  DC  All  LDC  DC
Growth  Capital  per  .495  .472  .636  .550  .521  .571
worker  (12.0)  (9.89)  (9.71)  (9.31)  (7.16)  (9.07)
Growth  of Years  of  .070  .092  -.037  .009  .050  .036
schooling  (2.16)  (2.30)  (1.03)  (.321)  (1.10)  (1.39)
N  92  71  21  80  59  21
R-Squared  .667  .663  .846  .539  .525  .821
Notes:  Absolute values of t-statstics  in parenthesis.
2  World Bank  data on GDP at market  prices expressed  in constant  prices in dollars  using 1987  Atlas exchange
rates.
24  The fact that human  capital accumulation  does not contribute  as significantly  to growth as one would  expect
from factor shares  is not unique. Spiegel  (1994)  for instance,  in estimating  a neoclassical  growth regression  (table
9) finds  that  human  capital  ranges  from .061 to .123 without  initial  income  as a covariate  and from -.059 to .041  when
including  initial  income. Similarly,  Judson  (1993)  finds  (table  6) coefficients  on hurman  capital  (using Nehru  data on
education)  between  .088 (fixed effects)  and .127 (between). Pritchett  (1995)  discusses  these  issues in depth.31
Appendix  2:  Shares of factor income to physical and human  capital
The estimates  of a 'production function" relationship  in appendix 1 are unsatisfactory
for two reasons. First, cross country from individual  level studies on the returns to education
suggest  that education  is in fact highly productive  at the individual  level. Since the Solow (or
extended  Solow)  models are constant returns to scale the model itself tells us what the
coefficients  ought to be: the factor income shares.  Zero cannot be the correct answer for the
fraction  of GDP attributable  to human  capital. The issue of the impact  of human  capital on
growth is discussed  much more in depth in Pritchett (1995a).
This appendix  describes  the basis of our guesses  for the share of factor income
accruing to physical capital and human capital.
Physical  capital The aggregate  numbers from the national accounts  of OECD  countries
give figures between .295 (for Sweden)  and .531 (for Greece). The average  is .403.
Table  Al .1:  Shares  of capital  in factor income  in various  OECD  countries. 1990
Country  Share  of capital
l  ________________________________  income in GDP













Note: Source, OECD, 1993. Reported  is the share of capital  (consumption  of
fixed  capital  plus  operating  surplus)  as a share of factor income  (GDP less
indirect  taxes  plus  subsidies).
For the U.S. Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni  (1987)  use highly sectorally
disaggregated  estimates  of capital, labor, and value added to estimate that the share of capital
in income  varied only between .364 in 1949  to .384 in 1969.32
Reported  capital shares for developing  countries are harder to come by.  Reported
capital shares in the national accounts  are typically  not able to disentangle  capital income from
proprietor's income (which includes all of peasant agriculture), so the reported "capital" share
is substantially  overstated.
The capital output ratios estimated in the Nehru and Dhareshewar  and King and Levine
also provide a check on the share of capital income. King and Levine show that the average
capital-output  ratio for OECD  countries is 2.51 and is 1.6 for non-oil, non-OECD countries.
The Nehru-Dhareshewar  capital  output ratio is 2.47 for the whole sample. If the K/Y ratio is
2.5 then if the rate of return to capital, r, is 16 percent then the share of capital rK/y is .4.  At
a K/Y ratio of 1.6 the rate of return has to be 25 percent for the capital share to be .4.
All in all .4 seems a fair estimate, perhaps a little generous to capital, but less so than
the regressions, where the coefficient  was more like .5.
Human capital Calculating  the share of labor income  that is due to human  capital is
trickier, as there is no national  accounts  counterpart. One calculation  is to assume a wage
increment to each year of schooling  and then calculate  on the basis of the labor force in
various educational  categories  what the share of human  capital would be.  That is, if
educational  group j (say, primary school completers)  has completed  k,  years of schooling
and the wage increment  to each year of schooling  is r and the wage of workers with no
schooling  is wO  then the share of the total wage  bill that can be attributed  to human capital is:
EJ  (w, - wo)  *a
Human  capital  share=  L
w * Li
where the wage in category  j is,
w'  =  w.  (*  +r)k 
The results in table A1.2 suggest  that the share of human  capital in the total wage bill
developing  countries is probably between .35 and .5, while the share is likely considerably
higher for developed  countries. The rate of return of 10 percent is about the average estimate
from Psacharopoulus  (1993)  while 14 percent was chosen to produce  a human capital share of
.5, since that is what this paper uses.33
Table A1.2: Shares of human capital in the wage bill
Region  Assumed  wage increment  from a year of
schooling:
10%  14%
Developing  countries  .364  .504
Sub-Saharan  Africa  .263  .369
Latin America  .434  .576
South Asia  .302  .437
OECD  .621  .751
Note:  Calculation  is done using data from Barro and Lee (1993) on the distribution  of the
labor force across educational  attainment  categories, assuming  a standard number of years
of schooling  for each educational  attainment  category and an equal percentage wage
increment  for each year of schooling.
An even simpler calculation  is that if someone  knew the wage of someone with no
human  capital (  ,  ) and the average wage  (  w.,  ) then the share of human  capital is:
Human capital shar=I  - IWHx 
,
Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992)  use this to propose a human  capital share of wage bill of %/2
because the U.S. minimum  wage has historically  been about half the average wage (although
actually the minimum  as a fraction  of the average  has fallen from around .5 in 1970 to .37 in
1992, Statistical  Abstract of the United  States, 1993, table 675).  This data is much harder to
come by in developing  countries, as the minimum  wage is less enforced  and less likely to be
applicable, and is harder to obtain solid data on in any case.
Although  it is somewhat  generous  to human capital, I assume a human  capital share of
.5 of the wage bill, hence .3 overall (.5*.6).I  ,Policy Research Working Paper Series
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